The entire report is available on the Delta Dragon web site

http://www.cantho-rvn.org/TET/tet-307cab.html

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 307TH COMBAT AVIATION (PHANTOM) BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96296

SUBJECT:  Documentation of Army Aviation Operations (29 January through 29 February 1968)

Commanding Officer
164th Aviation Group
APO U. S. Forces 96215

1.    Task Organization:  During the period 29 January through 29 February 1968, the 307th Combat Aviation Battalion included:

        a.  Headquarters and headquarters company 307th Combat Aviation Battalion stationed at Soc Trang, RVN.

        b.  The 199th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1) stationed at Vinh Long, RVN.

        c.  The 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company with the 325th Signal Detachment (RL) attached and stationed at Soc Trang, RVN.

        d.  The 235th Armed Helicopter Company with the 608th Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 190th Signal Detachment (RL) attached and stationed at Can Tho, RVN.

        e.  The 244th Surveillance Airplane Company with the 502nd Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 537th Signal Detachment (RL & RX) attached and stationed at Can Tho, RVN.        

2.    Significant offensive and defensive Actions:

        a.  Can Tho City and Can Tho Airfield:  The 307th CAB has one half of its resources at the Can Tho Airfield.  The 235th AHC, the 244th SAC and a platoon from the 221st RAC are stationed at the airfield.  During attacks upon the airfield, the assets of these units come under the centralized control of the airfield commander.  Because of the command structure, the action outlined will be confined to each unit's contribution.

At 0300 hours 31 January 1968, the Viet Cong launched an attack against Can Tho City and the airfield.  The defensive posture of the 244th SAC was at 100%, and the unit was manning positions on both the north and south side of the airfield.  Double security was placed in each revetment and machine guns were placed in these areas to provide a second defensive line.  The 235th AHC, also 100% committed, was providing a Firefly for the Phong Dinh Sector and Highway 4 Firefly in Dinh Tuong Sector.  Because of the alert status in effect, all of the mission ready aircraft were placed on strip alert and assigned crews were with the aircraft.  The unit had a mixture of UH-1C gunships and AH-1G helicopters at this time.  All personnel were either on the Can Tho defensive perimeter, assigned as crews on strip alert or assigned defensive positions in the revetment area.  The personnel assigned in the revetment area had a dual function not only to defend the revetment, providing a second line of defense for the airfield, but also as ammo and fuel handlers for the airborne aircraft.

When the attack began, illumination by Special Forces located on the airfield revealed attacks from both northwest and southwest of the airfield.  The force appeared to be at least two full company size units.  The 235th AHC had aircraft airborne and engaging targets at 0303 hours.  The gunships of the 235th AHC, because of the numerous targets, were continually rotating with new fire teams as they expended their ammunition.  The aircraft had to be rearmed and refueled while the airfield was actually under attack with much of the incoming fire being directed at the gunships flight line.

The ground action of the 244th and 235th was significant and produced many heroic acts.  On the north side of the compound the VC main force was immediately engaged by tremendous fire power.  A Xenon searchlight was brought into position on the extreme west end of the ramp and illumination of the threat area north of the runway was accomplished.  This enabled all weapons to be brought to bear at the point of greatest threat.  When breaks in the fog and cloud layer would permit, the gunships from the 235th were able to engage the enemy and placed accurate fire continuously within 50 meters and at times closer to the friendly positions.  Simultaneously the VC attack launched on the south side of the runway was directly at the 244th perimeter line.  The Unit Security Officer detected movement to his front and directed his men to hold their fire.  The VC unit moved to within 10-15 feet of the 244th SAC line before the command to fire was given.  The VC unit, estimated at platoon size, was immediately engaged at close range, and was almost wiped out by the first volley.  Under grenade and mortar attack, the men of the 244th, all but two who had never heard a shot fired in anger, fought at extremely close quarters like seasoned soldiers until a red flare on the horizon signaled a retreat for the VC forces.  When dawn broke, 67 dead were counted along the north side of the airfield, and 30 wounded POW's were found.  Over 100 lbs of plastic charges were found, numerous B40 rockets, and large stocks of Russian AK-47 rifles, grenades, satchel charges, and ammunition were taken.  Numerous VC dead and wounded had been carried away in the night as evidenced by blood trails and dragging marks.

Throughout the engagement the O-1 aircraft of the 221st RAC were airborne and provided the eyes for the Sector TOC in the defense of the area.  The O-1 aircraft were able to assist the ground units by giving enemy movements in the continuing clearing operations conducted throughout the next day.  They also accounted for 10 VC KBA within the city.  A significant event occurred when Cpt Joseph Lazzard spotted an APC the VC had captured and attacked it with rockets and machine guns forcing it to flee down Highway 4 to a place where it could be destroyed by an anti-tank weapon.  The VC continued the offensive against Can Tho with repeated mortar and recoilless rifle attacks during the month of February.  He began a systematic probing of the perimeter each night to find weak spots, and positioned snipers around the airfield to harass landing aircraft and ground crews.

The next significant attack occurred on 15 February when the infamous VC Tay Do Battalion attacked the airfield.  Elements of the battalion kidnapped members of the Vietnamese RF company located inside the compound on the west end, marched into their camp, assassinated the unit's officers and dependents and began to attack the airfield.  Illumination was not immediately available; however, OV-1's hastily equipped with flares were scrambled and soon provided the much needed light for the conduct of the defense.  The mortars of the overrun RF company were turned against the airfield but were immediately silenced by very accurate fire from the 235th AHC AH-1G gunships.  Ground elements of the 244th and 235th and the gunships soon proved too much in the way of firepower and the enemy signaled a retreat with a red flare.

The direct fire support of the gunships at Can Tho definitely played a singular role in the overwhelming defeat of the enemy in the numerous engagements throughout the documented period.

    b.    Vinh Long Airfield:  At approximately 0310 hours on the morning of 31 January 1968, the Viet Cong initiated a coordinated mortar and ground attack against Vinh Long Airfield, Republic of Vietnam.  As the intensity of incoming mortar rounds diminished, personnel of the 199th RAC began moving to their assigned defensive positions on the west end of the Vinh Long runway.  The defensive mission of the unit was to secure the western end of the runway, protect the unit's aircraft, and to repel any enemy ground attack from that end of the airfield.

Even as the lead elements of the company defensive force reached the transient revetments, a fire fight was in progress between the VC and the night crew augmented company guard which were the first elements to take the enemy under fire in the company's defensive area.  It was during this initial fire fight that Sp/4 Fred K. m. Hatada's courageous actions resulted in his being mortally wounded and Sp/5 Kenneth H. Erickson receiving his wounds which required medical evacuation.  Sp/4 Hatada was a flight operations specialist and Sp/5 Erickson a crew chief.

Maj John S. Jacob, the company commander, SFC Dwight C. Clark, the unit First Sergent, Cpt Richard M. Pribnow, the second platoon commander, and WO Richard W. Shoup were the first to arrive from the company billets area, and they encountered intense small arms and automatic weapons fire as they attempted to reach the wounded personnel and stop the enemy's advance.  The VC were already in several revetments which contained unit O-1 aircraft and although they could not suppress the enemy fire with the weapons at hand they were able to deny the enemy freedom of movement within the revetments.  Three of these four personnel were wounded, and the fourth had a round pass through his helmet barely missing his head.  As these personnel were forced to pull back, other members of the unit were arriving on the scene.  Cpt Robert S. Jones, Jr., the company's executive officer, Cpt Charles Baker, the general support platoon commander. and Cpt Daniel P. Alfridge, the unit maintenance officer along with aircraft mechanics, cooks, clerks, supply and maintenance support personnel at this time took up the offensive and began rooting out the entrenched VC from the revetments.  By the coordinated use of hand grenades plus fire and maneuver these personnel advanced from revetment to revetment under intense enemy fire.  As each revetment was cleared, personnel were positioned to prevent enemy reinforcement and to re secure the unit's defensive perimeter.

When the advancing group reached the second revetment east of the general support hanger, they administered aid to the wounded and recovered the body of Sp/4 Hatada.  At this point the VC had been boxed in and they broke from the revetments and attempted to flee south over a mound of dredged sand and thereby escape into the rice paddies and trees on that side of the airfield.  The fleeing enemy were taken under fire and killed or wounded by accurately placed and devastating fire by company personnel.  Cpt Jones, Cpt Baker and WO Shoup with a small group of men eradicated the remaining VC with their personal weapons and grenades tossed to them by Cpt Aldridge.  After the general support platoon hanger was regained, the group continued toward the second platoon hanger and linked up with personnel there thus restoring the perimeter and securing the company's defensive position.  At this time relief was sent to the unit's machine gun position located on the dredged sand.  These machine gun positions were effectively and heroically manned throughout the encounter and although cut off by the VC until the perimeter was secured, they were instrumental in preventing enemy reinforcements from entering the battle and protecting the flanks of the unit.

As the sun rose on the morning of 31 January, the initial assault by the VC had been stopped in the 199th RAC area of responsibility, and the enemy had been made to pay dearly for his effort.  Ten VC were killed and six VC were captured in the company aircraft revetments, and the adjacent area.  In addition one US BAR, four US carbines, one US M-1, one AK-47, and two Chicom rifles along with great amounts of ammunition for these weapons as well as satchel charges and hand grenades were discovered on the bodies of the dead VC, in the revetments and on the dredged sand to the south.  Numerous documents of varying importance were also captured and turned into the intelligence channels.  During this initial action, personnel of the unit suffered 1 KIA and 7 WIA.  A check of the battle area in the company's area of responsibility disclosed that even though the VC had been in the revetments with satchel charges, they had not been able to place them and no aircraft had been destroyed.  Of the twelve O-1 aircraft in the revetments only four had been damaged and these were all repairable at unit level.  The immediate and decisive action taken by each member of the unit had saved the aircraft and the unit was able to continue to perform its mission of supporting elements of the 7th and 9th ARVN Division, all assigned sectors in the IV Corps Tactical Zone and to continue to provide a general support capability.

An after-action evaluation indicated the brunt of the VC attack had been directed against aircraft in the 199th and also the 175th AHC revetments located on the south side of the airfield.  The action in the 175th area also included revetment to revetment fighting and the ejection and destruction of the enemy force from these areas was instrumental in reducing the loss of valuable aviation assets on the airfield.  Other units participating in the defense of Vinh Long Airfield were the 346th Aviation Detachment, the 611th Transportation Company (ADS), the 114th Assault Helicopter Company, the 52nd Signal Detachment, the HAL-3 (Sea Wolves) plus attached support elements.

The defensive/offensive force of the 199th RAC was composed of pilots, cooks, clerks, crew chiefs and maintenance personnel.  All elements of the company participated in the defense of the airfield.  Many members of the unit had gone directly from BCT to AIT in their specialized fields with no additional training as infantrymen.  The TOE mission of the company is combat support, but by demonstrated ability, aggressiveness and dedication to duty, the unit performed in an extraordinary manner in defense of Vinh Long Airfield.

    c.    Soc Trang Airfield:    There were thirteen (13) attacks on the Soc Trang Airfield during the period 29 January through 29 February 1968.  These attacks were primarily composed of attacks utilizing 75mm recoilless rifle fire.  There were two instances of mortar fire during the attacks.  Five of the thirteen (13) attacks were accompanied by minor ground type attacks with small arms and automatic weapons fire.  The 221st RAC was the eyes of the Province and the Airfield TOC's during this period.  Continuous night airfield security was flown by the 221st which also included a flare capability.  Back up flare capability was provided with the addition of a U-6 to the 307th CAB during the period.  One mission during the period required the use of the U-6 to drop flares over an outpost under attack even though there was a ceiling of 1200 feet.  Utilizing the airfield GCA and having the aircraft drop flares on command, the ground controller can effectively control the aircraft and position it with respect to wind and insure continuous light over a target for up to 1 hour and 30 minutes.  This technique was developed and all of the local outposts are now placed on a grid overlay with the airfield GCA should the need ever arise again.

3.    Total Number of Airmobile Operations Participated in by Unit:  Unable to document as AAE, IV Corps will shift assets numerous times during a day to insure mission accomplishment and the same fire team might support 2 or 3 different air mission commanders.

4.    Significant Airmobile Operations:  This unit does not plan or execute airmobile operations but is under OPCON of a mission commander of another unit when conducting airmobile operations.

5.    N/A

6.    N/A

7.    Administration Missions Accomplished:    77

8.    Ammunition Expended:

        2.75Rkts        7.62mm        40mm        5.56mm        .50 cal
         25,865       3,986,800        8,028         11,200           2,000

9.    Casualty information:
                      Friendly                            Enemy
            KHA    WHA    HHA               KIA    WIA
                15         79         41             1,588       55

10.    Number of Decorations Received for the Period:

DSC   DSM   SS   LOM   DFC   SM   BS   BS"V"   AM   AM"V"   ACM   ACM"V"   PH
                          1                      7               2                     12                                                      20

11.    Number of Recommendations for Awards for the Period:

DSC   DSM   SS   LOM   DFC   SM   BS   BS"V"   AM   AM"V"   ACM   ACM"V"   PH
                        17                    36               4        29      153         5             8           61            49

12.    Copies of Letters of Commendation:

        Incl.   1.    21st INFANTRY DIVISION
                  2.    MACV TEAM 56, PHONG DINH PROVINCE
                  3.    9TH INFANTRY DIVISION ADVISORY DETACHMENT

13.    Statistical Information:    Incl.  4

STATISTICAL DATA (29 Jan - 29 Feb 68)   (note: O-1 combined 199th & 221st)

14,    Armed Helicopter Questionnaire:    Incl.  5

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 Incl.
    as

"A TRUE COPY"

JAMES L. PERSON
Major, Artillery

information in this page courtesy of the Delta Dragon web site.